ABSTRACT: The Telecommunications industry is usually characterised by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing. In such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximising welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm: the second-best pricing scheme. The possible Welfare Losses due to second-best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs, prices and demand elasticities. In this paper we intend to analyse to what extent the second-best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese Telecommunications firm CTT, over the period 1950-1984 as well as the magnitude of the price-cost margins and Welfare Losses created. We obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale, a Welfare Loss estimate of 1% of the Telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40% greater than marginal cost. We concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfare over the sample period (it should be noted that it is the non-digital and fixed-wire infrastructure period). Therefore, it is important to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services provided in the old regulatory scenery.
Introduction
Over the past decade many changes have occurred in the telecommunications industry all over the world. These changes led several authors to investigate the issue of telecommunications regulatory reform with particular emphasis on the question of why should government interfere and in what conditions. The economic literature, as surveyed by Braeutigam (1989) , points out two conditions that justify regulatory intervention in an industry: the existence of a natural monopoly and an important Social Welfare Loss due to "second-best" pricing.
An industry is considered a natural monopoly if in any relevant range of the output, a single firm in the market achieves a lower unit cost of production than two or more competitors . In such a case competition leads to an inefficient production structure, because prices are set higher and less demand is satisfied. Given its relatively small marginal costs and important positive fixed costs, significant economies of scale are present in the telecommunications industry.
If the firm must charge a uniform tariff and the net economic benefit is measured by the sum of producer plus consumer surplus, economic theory states that optimal price is achieved when the service is provided to all customers who are willing to pay at least as much as the marginal cost of production. However, in the natural monopoly case this would entail a negative level of profits. The solution to the welfare maximisation question, subject to a viability constraint, leads to the "second-best" pricing 1 solution.
At this price level there is a "dead-weight loss" which can be measured by the sum of the variations in the consumer and producer surpluses. Willig (1976) has studied the robustness of this measure to the underlying assumptions 2 and found it to be quite reliable. Notwithstanding the recent contributions of Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (1997) Second, the usage charge is utilized instead of the two-part tariff, as in Gabel and Kennet (1993) . Finally, in the Social Welfare function consumer and producer surpluses with equal weights are included, and distribution effects are not taken into account 5 .
The methodology adopted here follows that used by Braeutigam (1989) to decide when to regulate a natural monopoly. The paper is 
Methodological Issues
Marginal costs, prices and elasticity of demand influence the possible Welfare Loss. As some recent studies did (Kim, 1995) this study begins by obtaining a marginal cost measure using the estimation of a Translog Cost Function, which is a very flexible function because it is obtained as a second order approximation to any cost function. The Translog Cost Function that we used has one variable for output 6 and three variables as inputs: capital, materials and labour and one variable for the technical progress.
Once the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed (Greene, 1997) Finally, the Welfare Loss can be measured by the "dead-weight loss triangle" given by the equation 10 :
where ε is the price elasticity of telecommunication services.
Data and Estimation Procedures.
The methodology followed here, in relation to the Portuguese telecommunications industry, is subject to an important limitation. We know This method is more efficient than OLS the greater is the correlation between the disturbance terms from different equations and the lesser is the correlation between dependent variables.
Empirical Results
The results for the estimation of the Translog cost function are shown in Table I . In general all parameter estimates have the expected sign and statistical tests seem to ensure that variables are statiscally significant. [ INSERT TABLE I ] Following the methodology presented in Section II, we present in Kiss et al. (1987) .
To determine the Welfare Loss, the published price elasticities estimated by Pereira (1991) for the period 1968-1988 were used. It was assumed that these results are also valid for a longer period. The usage price elasticities selected ranged from -0.064 to -0.1596 13 . The results show a Welfare Loss ranging from 0.0972% to 0.6042%, according to the value used for the demand elasticity. This is, as Brauetigam (1989) put it, a "very tolerable" loss.
Despite the small Welfare Loss, it seems that prices are set in a way that takes into account the survival of the firm. The estimated cost margin for this period is 40.631%, close to Rohlf's (1979) estimate of 50% for local services. The results also suggest that prices are set close to the secondbest solution estimated by Cabral (1990) (price-cost of access margin of 100% and price-cost of use margin of 25%).
Conclusion
As Seabra (1993) and others, this study found some evidence that the market for Portuguese telecommunications was a natural monopoly. Our estimates are a rough approximation to the subadditivity issue, because a single variable was used as output and the telecommunications market is greatly represented by multi-product firms. Nevertheless we can conclude that the production of telephone service with the fixed-wire technology, over this period, 1950-1984 , exhibits a strong level of scale economies. And this is the sufficient condition for the existence of a single output natural monopoly.
The main issue in this paper was not the existence of a natural monopoly but the estimate of the relative magnitude of the welfare loss due to the price behaviour of the telecommunications firm studied. Thus, a positive analysis of the welfare implications of the specific regulatory environment was followed, prevailing on the Portuguese telecommunications market. The Portuguese telecommunications firm was publicly owned. A positive profit of the firm could be assumed as a substitute to government taxation 14 . The price-cost margin estimate obtained was not significantly different from second-best optimal estimates. The welfare loss generated seemed to be very "tolerable".
The main result seems to be that the price regulation and the public ownership of this Portuguese telecommunications firm did not seriously affect social welfare over our sample period.
It should finally be noted that the analysis of this paper refers to the non-digital technology period and our conclusions must be indubitably associated with this. Therefore, an important task for further work is to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services provided on the old regulatory environment.
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